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1. Introduction 
In 1991, the New Zealand government passed the RMA, a landmark framework that devolves 
natural resource management authority to politically elected regional councils and encourages 
a collaborative approach to problem solving for the purpose of facilitating sustainable natural 
resource use.  Yet, problems abound with the implementation of the RMA, not least of which 
is that it has proved to be long on environmental rhetoric and short on the ability to achieve 
its overarching legislative mandate of sustainability.  As well, regional councils have been 
significantly constrained politically and institutionally to discharge the collaborative role 
effectively and, in fact, have opted instead to allocate surface and groundwater resources 
using command-and-control regulatory strategies grounded in a prior allocation, or “first-in-
time, first-in-right” property rights framework (Memon and Selsky, 2004). In the case of the 
South Island’s most populated region, Canterbury, growing demand for water resources since 
1991 has increased competition and conflicts between different stakeholders for access to 
scarce water resources. The result has been a rapid advance toward the full allocation and, in 
many areas, unsustainable over-allocation of existing water resources along with 
accompanying negative ecological and water quality effects. Given current and expected 
growth in water use demand over the next several decades, the pending crisis of water 
resource use and management in Canterbury can only be described as acute and in need of a 
new approach capable of reframing stakeholders’ decisions in support of water resource 
sustainability for the long haul. Notwithstanding the recently emergent public concerns about 
declining water quality, the water quality issues in Canterbury are long-standing and with 
limited natural attenuation potential. Climate is the primary driver of hydro-systems, with 
evidence of sub-regional climate variation over the last few decades (Martin and Williams, 
2006). 
 
 
 Our objective in this paper is to draw on the increasingly voluminous international 
literature on collaborative approaches to watershed, natural resource, and ecosystem 
management to critically appraise the potential for successful collaborative governance of 
water resources in New Zealand, specifically in the Canterbury region of the South Island1 
and specifically for the purpose of engendering sustainable communities. By sustainable 
communities we mean an approach to governing “in which economic vitality, ecological 
integrity, civic democracy, and social well-being are linked in complementary fashion, 
                                                 
1
 The Canterbury case study examines the situation as it was until November 2007. Since 
then, a number of potentially significant initiatives have been undertaken by the Canterbury 
Regional Council to address water issues. The case study is based on in-depth interviews with 
a range of key stakeholders. To protect confidentiality, the respondents are not identified 
personally. 
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thereby fostering a high quality of life and a strong sense of reciprocal obligation among its 
members” (Hempel 1999, 48, 52). The approach to sustainability thus necessarily rejects the 
more traditional top-down, expert-led processes for deciphering and achieving sustainability2 
because it is believed that experts acting alone are inherently unable to deal with the 
complexity of the sustainability challenge and that long-term environmental policy success 
necessarily must involve the citizenry ultimately responsible for translating sustainability 
theory into successful on-the-ground results.3 In short, we focus on collaboratives because the 
literature suggests that informed, deliberative engagement with stakeholders and the wider 
community can resolve competing demands, discover common ground and create ownership 
in jointly decided decisions and policies, improve environmental outcomes, support economic 
growth and profit-making activities, increase trust, and, more generally, facilitate the 
sustainable use and management of natural resources (Heikkila and Gerlak 2005; Kates, 
Clark et al. 2001; Mazmanian and Kraft 1999a; Ostrom 1990; Sabatier et al. 2005; Weber 
2003, forthcoming).4  Building successful collaborative capacity for the sake of sustainable 
communities, however, is not easy to do.  There is general agreement that the effectiveness of 
a collaborative approach is contingent on having in place appropriate institutional 
arrangements that take into account the nature of the problem as well as the social, economic, 
and political context (Agrawal, 2001; Hanna, Folke, and Maler 1996; Healey, 2007; Lysak 
and Weber 2007; Sick 2008; Silver et al, 2007; Verma, 2007). 
 With these lessons in mind we focus our attention on the Canterbury region of New 
Zealand’s South Island and ask “what are the obstacles to a successful collaborative approach 
focused on sustainable communities?”  Using data derived from multiple sources, including 
published and unpublished documentary records, and in-depth interviews with key 
stakeholders in Canterbury conducted in November and December 2007, we find five 
primary obstacles to collaboration in Canterbury.  First, some stakeholders have little or no 
incentive to cooperate, much less cooperate for the sake of sustainability given the current 
global economic climate for farm commodities, the current institutional inertia within New 
Zealand that works to reinforce the status quo slide toward unsustainable water use, and the 
fact that many, if not most people do not know, much less agree, that widespread water 
resource scarcity is a problem.  Second, stakeholders and experts lack the scientific 
information necessary to develop an effective strategic, integrated water management system 
needed to support the collaborative sustainability approach.  Third, stakeholders in 
Canterbury currently are operating in a low trust environment grounded in weak social 
capital.  Fourth, the kind of leader(s) required to move collaboration and, by extension, 
sustainability, forward have not been evident, although this may now be changing. Fifth and 
finally, there are the complexities and uncertainties associated with the incorporation of 
Maori customary water rights under the Treaty of Waitangi. 
The paper starts with the elucidation of key themes found in the international 
literature on institutional arrangements for the collaborative governance of natural resources, 
while the following section explores the obstacles to successful collaboration in the 
                                                 
2
 The attempts to determine just what sustainability is and how it will be achieved tend to be 
top-down and expert-led, with limited public input, a command-and-control orientation, and 
indicators “developed by scientists for scientists” (Bell and Morse 1999, 48). 
3
 Nijkamp and Perrels (1994). The move toward ecosystem management, more generally, 
also “require[s] a much more active role for citizens than was true of past resource planning 
and management efforts” (Cortner and Moote 1999, 61). 
4
 The related theme of adaptive water governance also highlights the imperative for 
deliberative community engagement in managing water resources based on trust and social 
learning (Scholz and Stiftel 2004). 
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Canterbury region.  The final section offers conclusions on whether and how such barriers to 
collaboration might be overcome, while also appraising recent efforts by Environment 
Canterbury (henceforth ECAN), the elected regional government council for the Canterbury 
region, to move towards collaborative, integrated watershed (or catchment) management. 
 
 
2. Building Blocks for the Collaborative Governance of Water Resources 
The sustainable development paradigm highlights the imperative to adopt water resource 
allocation strategies to achieve sustainability well-beings as policy outcomes. Approaching 
the water resource management issue from the integrated sustainability angle entails making 
difficult trade-offs between the many competing and often highly contested in-stream and 
abstractive uses of scarce surface and ground water resources. This means that the process of 
water allocation by any water allocation authority seeking sustainability is inherently 
political. Collective choices about the scope of management, who participates and how, and 
how collective decisions are made to resolve conflicts cannot be avoided by creating a single 
watershed authority with broad powers to comprehensively manage water on an integrated 
basis.  In fact, there are a range of approaches and methods available that can be used to 
allocate water resources in order to achieve desired policy outcomes. Such methods range 
from regulatory approaches to market based economic instruments and community-based 
approaches.  Notwithstanding the relative merits of these different methods (hierarchies, 
markets and networks), two of the key themes in the recent water resource governance 
literature that is devoted to making water resource management more effective, hence 
improving the likelihood of sustainable water use across time, are the concept of appropriate 
institutional arrangements and the prospect that a more networked system of governance that 
actively incorporates and empowers community-based collaborative institutions may well be 
the key to achieving successful integrated, sustainable water usage (Agrawal 2002; Pretty 
2003; Ostrom 1990; Stiftel and Scholz 2005; Weber 2003). 
We use the term institutional arrangements here more broadly compared with its 
common usage. The common usage of the term institutions pertains to an organisational 
entity such as a family, a firm or a government department. We use the term ‘institution’ in 
its sociological sense, as a rule, norm, or custom simultaneously enabling and constraining 
human agency (Bakker, 2002; Healey, 2007; Verma, 2007). The term institution 
encompasses formal rules (such as statutory prescriptions) and informal norms, roles and 
operating practices that are so stable, structured and accepted that they can said to be 
‘institutionalized’.  Thus, one scholar has defined the term institutions as “the [formal and 
informal] rules of the game in a society or … the humanly devised constraints that shape 
human interaction” (North, 1990). Such rules and roles operate within and across 
organizations (Ostrom, 1990). Moreover, we focus our attention on institutions given that 
they have been found to play a critical role in determining the course and outcomes of 
human-environment relations (Connor and Dovers, 2004; Hanna, Folke and Maler 1996). 
Moreover, precisely because achieving sustainability is a long-term process, the role of 
institutional reform and institutional learning is critical because institutions exercise a major 
role in structuring human behavior (Agrawal, 2001) in terms of how humans interact with 
each other and how humans engage with their environments.  The constraints and incentives 
derived from institutions influence the decisions and choices people make and thus affect 
policy adoption, implementation, and policy outcomes (Clingermayer and Feiock, 2001; 
Weber 1998). 
 
 4 
 
The Expected Benefits of Collaborative Institutions 
When it comes to collaborative institutions, the expectation is that the institutional constraints 
and incentives will tend to encourage and direct human behavior toward more effective 
problem solving in the public realm. Put differently, over the past 20 years, the social science 
literature has identified a number of expected benefits for public problem solving associated 
with collaborative approaches. Collaborative governance has the potential to: 
• be more responsive to a broader variety of preferences and needs, thus increasing 
the likelihood of customized solutions which better take account of local 
circumstances and thus improve the effectiveness and legitimacy of governance 
outcomes and effective than top-down approaches (Gunningham, 2007). 
• reduce transaction costs relative to hierarchical top-down approaches, especially 
for heterogenous, dispersed problems.  The savings mean, for example, that more 
resources are available for attacking more public problems, or that fewer 
resources can be used to achieve the same amount of policy gain (Lubell 2002; 
Weber 1998); 
• promote social and cognitive learning and improve the quality of technical 
information, as well as the political and social information essential to successful 
problem solving and negotiations among diverse interests (Weber 2003; Suskind 
2004; Painter and Memon 2008); 
• incorporate societal diversity (a democratic ideal) and give citizens and other 
stakeholders a genuine stake in policies and outcomes, which translates into 
ownership, or buy in--a willingness to actively support and enforce final 
decisions made within the collaborative—and the enhancement of long-term 
community capacity for problem-solving (Blomquist and Schlager 2005; 
Gunningham 2007; Painter and Memon 2008; Weber 1998); 
• voluntarily leverage the expenditure of additional civil society and private sector 
resources on the behalf of the management and resolution of public problems 
that, if left unresolved, would more than likely lead to higher costs later, both in 
terms of economics (cleanup costs and, in many natural resource cases, 
constraints on future profitability) and society (quality of life costs) (Weber 
2003); 
• tap into the problem solving benefits that comes from the incorporation of 
diverse “ways of knowing,” particularly in the areas of experiential (practice-
based) and local knowledges (e.g., the culture and practices of indigenous 
people) (Gunningham 2007; Ingram 2008; Scott 1998); 
• increase the potential for positive sum, or win-win outcomes in which all 
stakeholders are better off than before the collaboration.  If the effort adopts a 
comprehensive, integrated approach, collaboration can increase the likelihood 
that the needs of multiple policy areas, for example, “environment, economy and 
community,” will be met on a more consistent basis (Weber 2003); and  
• transcend jurisdictional boundaries and match the biophysical realities of natural 
resource systems better than traditional approaches (Folke, Hahn,Olsson and 
Norberg 2005; Gunningham 2007). 
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The Importance of Antecedent Conditions 
The literature on collaborative institutions also makes clear that the likelihood of success in 
producing the presumed benefits is connected to the presence of certain conditions, 
particularly antecedent conditions and the design characteristics of the collaborative 
institution itself.  The appropriate antecedent conditions focus on the attributes of the 
resource or problem in question, the attributes of community, and the attributes of the 
existing institutions charged with the responsibility for managing said resources and/or 
problems.  Antecedent conditions are critical because they directly affect institutional choice 
in two ways.  First, they affect the incentives facing key actors to either stick with the non-
collaborative status quo or to choose the collaborative partnership alternative.  Second, 
antecedent conditions bear on the problem solving capacity within the community, or 
communities facing the problem(s).  In short, collaboratives are more likely to be embraced 
and to be successful to the extent actors face strong incentives to choose a collaborative 
alternative and the social-political context possesses the capacity to support the kinds of trust- 
and respect-based, good faith negotiations and relationships so central to successful 
collaborative problem solving efforts. 
 Tables 1, 2 and 3 highlight the antecedent conditions identified as important by a 
variety of different scholars.  Most all of the variables in these tables are taken verbatim from 
Sabatier, Leach, Lubell and Pelkey (2005, Table 6.1, 182) as derived from Lubell (2002), 
Ostrom (1990), and Schlager (1995).  Other literature sources added to these tables in support 
of the Sabatier et al. (2005) findings include Agrawal (2002), Baland and Platteau (1996), 
Ebrahim (2004), Kreps (1992), Putnam (1993), and Weber (1998).  The tables also offer brief 
conclusions as to how each variable fits the Canterbury, New Zealand water resource 
management case.   
 
TABLE 1/ Attributes of the Resource 
ATTRIBUTE CANTERBURY CASE 
Partnerships are more likely to form where environmental 
problems are heterogenous in nature and geographically 
dispersed, such as non-point source pollution.  Such 
dispersed problems create enormous transaction costs for 
centralized command and control regulation. 
Yes, the water resource 
management problem in 
Canterbury is 
heterogeneous and 
dispersed 
Partnerships are more likely to form where environmental 
problems are severe or perceived by most actors to be so. 
No, many do not perceive 
a water resource “crisis” 
Partnerships are more likely to form where there is good 
scientific data about the various facets of the problem(s) at 
issue (See also Weber 1998). 
Not good, getting better; 
compounded by 
adversarial use of science 
 
 
TABLE 2/ Attributes of Community 
ATTRIBUTE CANTERBURY CASE 
Partnerships are more likely to form in 
communities with high existing stores of human 
and social capital (See also Baland and Platteau 
1996; Ebrahim 2004; Pretty 2004; Putnam 1993). 
Human capital high; social 
capital strength varies, but 
generally weak 
Partnerships are more likely to form in 
communities where stakeholders have low discount 
rates, which equates to a willingness to trade short-
term costs for long-term benefits. 
Global demand for agricultural 
products & laissez faire national 
government approach creates 
high discount rates for many 
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Partnerships are less likely to form in situations of 
high cultural or belief heterogeneity. (See also 
Agrawal 2002; Baland and Platteau 1996). 
 
Socio-cultural/belief 
heterogeneity is high across 
Canterbury 
Partnerships are more likely to form in 
communities where the costs and benefits of 
management actions are spread equitably over 
different segments of the community. (See also 
Baland and Platteau 1996) 
Costs and benefits of current 
management actions are not 
spread equitably (in part because 
not all are regulated to the same 
extent) 
Partnerships are less likely to form in communities 
dominated by extractive industries or where the 
balance of power among major political interests is 
skewed. (See also Weber 1998) 
 
Extractive industries dominate 
most property in at risk water 
management zones 
 
TABLE 3/ Attributes of Existing Institutions 
ATTRIBUTE CANTERBURY CASE 
Partnerships are more likely to form when an 
existing institution has enough resources to 
subsidize initial transaction costs. (See also 
Agrawal 2002) 
 
Some resources available. 
Partnerships are more likely to form when 
existing institutions are not actively addressing, 
or are having limited success with the problems 
at issue (See also Baland and Platteau 1996; 
Ebrahim 2004; Weber 1998) 
Existing institutions are addressing 
some localised parts of the water 
resource problem set, but are having 
limited success in doing so on 
account of system-wide linkages. 
 
Partnerships are more likely to form where 
higher-level institutions grant local autonomy 
and/or publicly endorse or champion an 
alternative collaborative institution. (See also 
Weber 1998) 
National legislation (e.g., RMA) 
devolves responsibility and ECAN 
displays a nascent interest in same 
for catchments; but commitment to 
local autonomy is guarded  given 
current structure of, & lack of 
funding from, NZ government 
Partnerships are more likely to form when 
existing institutions with management 
responsibility for a public problem possess a 
reputation for credible commitment to 
collaborative processes and for being a good 
faith negotiator (Kreps 1992; Weber 1998). 
 
A problem for ECAN and for NZ 
governments more generally 
(rhetoric supports, but not 
necessarily funding and actions, at 
least on a consistent basis) 
Partnerships are more likely to form when 
mandatory regulatory standards/goals exist with 
firm deadlines that impose high costs on key 
stakeholders. Implied here is a reasonable 
degree of certainty that such regulatory 
standards/goals and deadlines will be enforced  
(Fiorino 1988). 
 
Attempts are being made to address 
water quality non-compliance but 
the ability to address water quantity 
non-compliance is severely hindered 
by the lack of water metering data 
& the current high rates of non-
compliance. 
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The Question of Institutional Design 
A problem arises, however, when some antecedent conditions are present, yet some do not.  
As noted in the previous tables, the Canterbury case falls into this category.  The region-wide 
problem of growing water scarcity, the heterogeneous and dispersed character of water 
resource management, and a few other conditions are present, yet most of the antecedent 
conditions considered appropriate for, or conducive to collaboration are absent in the 
Canterbury case.  Key stakeholders in the development and agriculture (e.g., dairy) camps do 
not see that a water resource allocation crisis is pending, in part because the science offers 
mixed messages in support of both sides’ arguments.  In addition, the current economic 
benefits from high global prices for agricultural commodities and the inequitable distribution 
of the costs and benefits of the current regulatory system (and the fear that it will remain so 
even with a new collaborative arrangement) discourages stakeholders from pushing for a 
collaborative. Tables 1 through 3 also make clear that other necessary conditions supporting a 
shift to, or the successful operation of, collaboration do not hold in Canterbury. 
In such a mixed message case, what lessons do the literature on collaboration offer to 
those seeking to capitalize on the conditions that are conducive to collaboration?  If the 
problematic, or absent conditions are grounded largely in the “community” and “existing 
institutions” area, as is the case in Canterbury, as opposed to the characteristics associated 
with the type of resource problem at issue, then the prospects for collaborative success can be 
enhanced through the application of specific institutional design principles.  The “principles” 
focus on minimizing the uncertainty of cooperation that accompanies low trust bargaining 
environments featuring diverse, heterogeneous interests.  They do this by emphasizing 
fairness, equity, and a protective social contract that obligates stakeholders to focus on 
developing solutions offering multiple positive sum benefits vis-a-vis the existing decision-
making context for the entire group, not just a particular position benefiting individuals or a 
selective portion of the group.  Put differently, seven institutional process factors appear to 
increase the probability for successful cooperation by creating for participants a genuine stake 
in decision processes and outcomes, an environment of trust, an opportunity to discover 
shared values, and an increased certainty that cooperation will lead to preferred benefits. 
 
Inclusiveness 
Successful collaboratives must include a broad-cross section of stakeholders across interests, 
governmental jurisdictions, and agencies with responsibilities for the wicked problem set in 
question. The inclusivity factor is important for reasons of democratic legitimacy and 
practical considerations related to problem solving and policy implementation.i With regards 
to the former point, achieving inclusivity requires collaboratives to practice government in 
the sunshine. This means an open access design that welcomes interested parties, and that 
encourages and allows a broad array of citizens and government officials to participate in 
proceedings, including “outsiders” who may only wish to monitor and report on collaborative 
activities to those outside the community where the effort is occurring. “Open access” also 
voluntarily endorses the community’s right to know about its proceedings, decisions, and 
projects by giving public notice of meetings, providing public access to meeting minutes, 
creating pertinent databases associated with decisions and projects, sponsoring public field 
trips, and, more generally, engaging the public through regular outreach activities. 
At the same time, pragmatism suggests that all stakeholders in a position to block or 
effectively undermine outcomes must be included and given a credible stake in the 
collaborative. Otherwise, collaborative participants encounter added uncertainty and face a 
greater likelihood of failure, as those left out mobilize resources in defence of their stakes. 
Failure to practice inclusion thus lessens the probability that implementation and the 
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establishment of the kinds of durable, effective policy programs able to deliver long-term 
problem solving benefits will occur. 
 
Formal Binding Collective Choice Rules with a Purpose: Promoting Fairness, Equity 
and Collective Gains 
A key design principle involves a set of formal binding collective choice rules for governing 
the collaborative process and its aftermath. The binding rules restrict the ability of public 
leaders and other stakeholders to pursue self-interested behavior at the expense of long-term 
cooperation, thereby reducing uncertainty and inducing a higher level of trust and 
cooperation than would otherwise be the case. The “rules” are grounded in four basic 
concepts: 
• shared decision-making power, a genuine stake in the decision process and, hence, 
collective outcomes, 
• explicit consideration of participants’ interests in programmatic language and the 
collective choice rules, 
• a written “protective” contract that identifies and arranges consequences for 
defections from the collaborative process, or other violations of the collective choice 
rules, and 
• active monitoring of agreements to ensure compliance. 
 
Shared decision authority grants participants a direct role in crafting and 
implementing programs, which gives them “the confidence to invest” in, and develop 
ownership of the outcomes produced by, the collaborative effort (Ostrom 1990, 93; Weber 
1998, 116). The explicit consideration of interests in programmatic language often includes 
mandated monitoring and data reporting systems so that progress and accountability for 
results are readily tracked, agreement on a standard decision-making procedure that forces 
decisions to consider a broad cross-section of interests and values before being accepted, and 
a broad, cross-cutting, balanced mission statement (e.g., protecting and preserving the health 
of the environment, economy and community) (Ostrom 1990, 93-94; Weber 1998, 115-116; 
2003). With respect to protective contracts, Weber (1998) notes the importance of written 
agreements not to litigate, or otherwise intervene to stop the implementation of jointly agreed 
decisions (116; see also Daniels and Walker 2001, 181). Ostrom (1990) focuses attention on 
the need for binding, yet graduated sanctions because people are fallible and they will make 
mistakes (94-96). 
There is general agreement that a consensus decision-rule is critical.ii The logic 
behind the consensus decision rule is that granting all participants a veto power over 
decisions leads to broad agreement, thereby increasing legitimacy, lowering implementation 
resistance, engendering self-enforcement, and respecting minority rights. Finally, there is 
general agreement that a clear mission statement is important because it iconstantly reminds 
participants of the ultimate goals of the collaborative. 
 
Ongoing, or Repeat Games 
The concept of repeat games means that the collaborative is grounded in an iterative, ongoing 
process of deliberation, negotiation, and problem solving as opposed to “single shot,” one 
time dispute resolution exercises designed to resolve a particular dispute.  In addition, 
participants’ involvement with the problem needs to be long-term and iterative. Thus, it 
matters whether participants are ongoing entities and are embedded in the relevant policy 
network such that they interact regularly with other stakeholders. For example, government 
agencies qualify as classic ongoing entities with significant resources, organic mandates, and 
a responsibility to work on the public problems at the center of wicked problem sets. Major 
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landowners or otherwise long-term (decades long), or even multi-generation, area residents 
whose livelihoods and family futures are directly tied to the successful management of 
wicked problems are another side of the same coin, as are organized interest groups or 
corporations with a presence in the geographic area or the policy subsystem for extended 
periods. Such ongoing, embedded entities or individuals are more likely to perceive the game 
as an iterative one requiring give-and-take, rather than as a one-time opportunity to advance 
their self-interest at the expense of others.iii 
 
Participant Norms 
Collaborative problem solving success is more likely to the extent there is a set of well-
crafted and diffused participant norms, or behavioral expectations for all participants (North 
1990).  The norms are part of an implicit bargain individuals strike prior to joining 
governance deliberations and are used to communicate the message that the character of the 
participation matters as much or more to problem solving and trust-building than the mere act 
of participation. Success here requires that leaders and individuals regularly enforce norms 
when violations occur, and that participants “live” the norms both inside and outside formal 
collaborative meetings. 
Despite the agreement on the importance of participant norms, there is no one set of 
“must have” norms for collaborative institutions. Nonetheless, there is empirical agreement 
on the kinds of norms found in successful collaboratives. Some examples include civility and 
respect for others (and their positions),iv integrity and honesty in communication and action,v 
acceptance of and respect for diversity,vi acceptance of existing laws,vii ensuring the equal 
opportunity to speak during meetings,viii a pragmatic focus on the future and what is possible 
(versus on past battles and baggage),ix making sure all views are represented even if a 
particular interest is absent that day,x and the acceptance of a dual role norm.xi 
 
The Leadership Element: Collaborative Capacity Builders 
There is general agreement that a distinctive kind of leadership is required for successful 
collaboration.xii  Necessary leadership traits and skills includes such basics as the possession 
of good communication and listening skills, respect for and ability to work with all sides of 
an issue, and strong people skills, meaning that the leader is comfortable with, and skilled at, 
interaction and outreach involving a diversity of different organizations and individuals. The 
collaborative leader also is not afraid to share power because s/he realizes this is necessary in 
order to get to positive sum, or win-win outcomes. In addition, successful collaborative 
leaders are those with a reputation for high capacity and honest, trustworthy leadership. 
Further, they tend to practice “inspired” leadership that relies on persuasiveness and 
charisma, and is skillful enough to balance the new decisions of self-interested participants 
within the collaborative, with the needs and interests previously codified in collectively 
decided public goals. Such collaborative capacity builders are also able to convince others to 
commit to and follow through on promises, cajole participants to stay the course when times 
get rough, and champion the collective, positive sum benefits of successful collaboration 
(Weber 1998).xiii  
When it comes to the leader’s role, the frameworks agree that key tasks include assisting 
participants in discovering common ground and the benefits of collaboration by identifying 
prospective tradeoffs, facilitating information exchanges, and conducting the decision process 
in a neutral, honest, and fair manner. Implicit in this role conception is that leaders are 
instrumental in convincing participants that their stakes will be protected during negotiations 
and decision-making, and that their participants’ own interests are likely to be best served by 
agreeing to bargain in good faith. 
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Credible Commitment 
The concept of credible commitment by participants entails consistency in words and actions 
which together evidence that a participant, along with their “home” organization, is 
supportive of the collaborative decision process and collective problem resolution.xiv  
Credible commitment to the collaborative institution means that participants willingly direct 
their power and resources to cooperate in good faith toward mutually agreeable decisions and 
then to promote, protect, and enforce such deals.  This means that participants will refrain 
from reneging on deals once agreed and will not use private information gained through 
cooperation for their own advantage.  To the extent that credible commitment exists, the more 
participants are able to exhibit a high degree of confidence, or trustworthiness in a 
participant’s behavior, and the greater the chances for collaborative success as participants 
become more willing to share private information, receive and accept others’ ideas, and 
engage in constructive deliberations. There appear to be five elements that contribute to this 
component. 
First, a high level of credible commitment attaches to organizations or groups that 
demonstrate clear and consistent support for collaboration throughout their hierarchy or 
group, and vice versa (Daniels and Walker 2001, 174; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993, 228, 
230; Weber 1998, 114-15). 
Second, there is agreement that all representatives need enough discretion and 
authority to make agreements and implement decisions, or, at a minimum, need a clear chain 
of command that is generally supportive of the collaborative effort and has the capacity to act 
in a timely manner. 
Third, the durability and consistency of representation across time not only signals 
commitment, but also increases the prospects for collaborative success by minimizing the 
chance of miscommunication and reducing the transaction costs associated with maintaining 
trust-based working relationships.xv This does not mean that new people cannot join, but it 
suggests that all stakeholding organizations are best served by committing their 
representatives for long terms as opposed to a regular rotation system. 
Fourth, credible commitment is enhanced to the extent participants evoke a clear, 
strong commitment to the “place” where the collaboration is occurring, its people, and its 
livelihoods (Daniels and Walker 2001; Cheng and Walker 2005 30; Weber 2003). Credible 
commitment thus requires respect for the past (no matter the mistakes by various actors), an 
appreciation for the present mix of businesses, livelihoods, and land tenure patterns, and a 
genuine concern for the goal of ensuring a sustainable future for the people, livelihoods, and 
place in question.xvi 
Finally, credible commitment to collaborative problem solving does not mean 
forsaking required commitments to a participants’ “home” organization, interest category, or 
to existing laws and agency missions (Sabatier et al. 2005, 195-96; Weber’s 1998, 112-14). In 
fact, a clear, strong commitment to one’s own agency or group mission is required because 
without it there will be little respect for the participant. The inability to make such a 
commitment weakens the capacity to influence proceedings, raises suspicions about where 
loyalties lay (i.e., what is their agenda?), and increases the chance they will be replaced by 
their organization, along with the probability that deals will be short-lived once the home 
organization learns of the apostasy. 
 
Technical Expertise and Beyond--Integrating and Applying a Broad Knowledge Base 
There is agreement that traditional sources of knowledge—physical, natural and social 
sciences as well as technical expertise (e.g., engineering)--are essential to collaborative 
processes (Daniels and Walker 2001, 171-73; Leach and Pelkey 2001; Leach and Sabatier 
2005, 244; Ostrom et al. 1993, 50; Weber 1998, 112). Yet the research findings also point to 
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the value added by local experiential knowledge--the individual and collective expertise of 
the community members most practiced or familiar with a problem in the geographic area in 
question (Daniels and Walker 2001, 13, 16; Scott 1998; Weber 1998, 2003, 217-220). Thus, 
there is a need for integrating, synthesizing, and balancing many different kinds of 
knowledge is implied by the very nature of collaborative processes focused on difficult public 
problems—the discussion and decision process automatically includes a broader, more 
diverse array of stakeholders that demands the sharing of information between and among 
participants (Weber and Khademian 2008). 
 
 
3. Obstacles to Collaborative Water Governance in Canterbury 
The problems associated with the current approaches to allocating and managing water 
resources in Canterbury have been magnified in recent years by increasing development 
pressures and a quantum leap in water resource use due to changing land use practices.  As a 
case study, this Section identifies, explores and synthesizes the political, economic, 
institutional and social dynamics that, when taken together, create a series of obstacles to the 
adoption of a collaborative governance approach focused on sustainable communities. 
 
3.1 Lack of incentives to cooperate for sustainability’s sake 
Even a cursory review of the water resource situation in the Canterbury region makes clear 
that key stakeholders lack incentives to change the status quo or to embrace a collaborative 
governance approach for the sake of sustainability.  This section clarifies the various 
components, institutional and otherwise, that impinge on stakeholder behaviour as a 
necessary first step for sorting out possible levers for changing behaviour.  
 
3.1. a    Defining Water Scarcity as a Problem 
 There is a problem definition issue.  The interviews make clear that there is not a 
broad embrace of the idea of water scarcity, or of impending crisis due to a combination of 
surging water use demand, the present full allocation and, in some cases, over allocation of 
the majority of Canterbury’s water resources, and the spectre of declining water resources 
due to climate change.  This is partly because the water “problem” is not evenly distributed 
across the region, therefore what is a problem for some is not a problem for others. A 
commonly expressed view is that “water is plentiful in the Canterbury region; it is only at the 
wrong place at the right time” (interview respondent 3). Of particular importance is the fact 
that Christchurch’s primary water supply comes out of the under-allocated Waimakariri River 
via groundwater, while the rest of Canterbury, especially the vast rural areas, are tied into 
separate, more stressed water supplies. Given that Christchurch is the major urban area in the 
Canterbury region, the uneven distribution of the problem serves to enhance the established 
rural-urban conflict and ever present distrust on many natural resource policies. At the same 
time, Canterbury has, in recent years, experienced what some describe as “only a short-term 
improvement” in moisture and water flows that nonetheless has served to alleviate some 
people’s concerns over the likelihood as well as the severity of the water scarcity problem.  It 
has also limited the ability of those focused on longer-term, negative water use and weather 
(i.e., moisture) trends “to walk enough landowners and resource users through the visible 
inspection of rivers and streams at very low stages of flow” in order to more forcefully 
illustrate key issues associated with water scarcity (interview respondent 1). The lack of a 
consensus on problem definition thus means that any push to change the existing water 
resource allocation and management regime unsurprisingly falls on at least some deaf ears 
and is viewed suspiciously in some quarters as but another “underhanded attempt” by ardent 
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environmentalists to push through their agenda of added restrictions on property rights and 
individual freedoms/behaviour (interview respondent 4).  
3.1.b    Globalized Markets, Water Consents, and the Environment Court 
 Major agricultural water users, especially farmers seeking additional water for 
converting existing property uses to dairying, have strong incentives to embrace and defend 
the current system of water allocation. Dryland farm properties in Canterbury with water 
permits command premium prices. The large, global increases in the prices for dairy products 
(e.g., milk solids) is the immediate cause of the rapid and massive conversion of rural 
Canterbury land.  Given recent buoyant prices (2006 through 2008 year) and the likely 
prospect that growing demand for New Zealand dairy products from developing countries, 
particularly China, will continue and most likely increase significantly in the near term of the 
next 10 to 20 years, farmers are investing in dairy because it promises to more than triple 
their farm-based income and land values vis-à-vis most all other agricultural alternatives. The 
relative certainty of the substantial economic payoff that comes from choosing water 
intensive dairy production is further enhanced, and some would say actively encouraged, by 
the current water permit application and approval process and recent decisions by the 
Environment Court.  Water permit applications are channelled through an ad hoc, 
individualized, applicant-driven process subject to limited constraints.  There are no strategic 
review requirements that force adequate consideration of the cumulative, or spillover effects 
on downstream users, much less the whole of Canterbury’s water resources.  Instead, new 
water permit applications are typically granted as long as the proposal meets the tests in the 
RMA in terms of acceptable environmental effects and prescribed environment flow regime, 
and taps into an available supply of surface or ground water.  Stakeholders opposed to a 
particular request can litigate and force the consent review process through New Zealand’s 
Environment Court, and many do just this (ECAN 2004).  However, as a practical matter the 
Environment Court tends to support new water permit applications as long as the water use is 
permitted and a reasonable scientific case can be made that the expanded usage fits within 
established, yet localized ecological parameters.  This does not necessarily mean that 
undertaking a water consent request in Canterbury is an inexpensive or timely proposition; it 
is not surprising to see the water consent process costing applicants hundreds of thousands of 
dollars and several years of time.  But it does mean that the combination of high prices for 
dairy products with a water permit application process and an Environment Court that favor 
individualized requests for more water incentivizes people to continue avoiding collaborative 
planning process with the promise of community sustainability.  In other words, converting to 
dairying with its intensive water demands, or business as usual, is occurring because it is a 
low risk proposition with great potential for a lucrative payoff. 
 
3.1.c    Sustainable Management Purpose of RMA as a Devolved Planning Mandate and 
Strategic Regional Water Management Plans 
 Third, there is institutional inertia favoring the status quo that stems from the RMA’s 
devolution of natural resource management authority to regionally elected officials.  Many 
have argued that Section 5 sustainable management purpose of the RMA has been interpreted 
too narrowly by regional governing councils, including in Canterbury. The narrow 
interpretation has meant that instead of managing water in a strategic, integrated fashion for 
broader sustainability purposes, elected officials and ECAN staff have opted for a much less 
politically controversial reading that allocates water according to some very basic “effects 
based” principles (Skelton and Memon 2002; Memon and Skelton 2007).  The scope of most  
regional water allocation plans in New Zealand is typically limited to specifying: 
• environmental baselines to protect instream values,  
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• which consent holders have priority when not all the allocated water is 
naturally available (e.g. during the dry season) and  
• how water will be shared between competing consumptive users, particularly 
for irrigation (e.g., priority users, rostering regimes). 
 
In addition, the ECAN regional plan does not contain long-term policies and priorities for 
allocating water efficiently between different broad classes of activities based on an 
assessment of anticipated future demands from different land use activities in relation to 
available supply. Nor does it contain a strategic policy framework for dealing with 
contentious issues such as the reallocation of water among classes of activities due to 
changing demands or the allocation of responsibility among water uses in cases where 
demand exceeds availability over the long-term (i.e., over-appropriation).  Further, ECAN 
policies typically lack timeframes for achieving stated objectives, calling into question the 
seriousness of the implementation and enforcement efforts. 
 A key reason for such a limited understanding of Section 5 and the subsequent 
limitations in current ECAN water management plans can be partly attributed to a view 
during the 1990s that the RMA does not permit elected councils to allocate water between 
different groups of uses, as explained earlier. Such a strategic planning approach was deemed 
akin to picking winners and was rejected by the national government and ECAN at that time. 
Moreover, the national government has provided little to no support or strategic policy 
guidance putting pressure on regional councils to move beyond a narrow reading of Section 5 
and to encourage the adoption of a stronger strategic approach to water management (Lowry 
et al, 2003; Memon and Skelton, 2007). Perhaps the most important factor in understanding 
the narrow interpretation of the RMA water allocation mandate, however, is that the RMA 
devolved responsibility to elected politicians who must necessarily be responsive to their 
constituents, many of whom are well organized and practiced at influencing policymakers.  In 
the Canterbury case, the elected leaders of ECAN were  a product of a relatively conservative 
population in which rurally based water user and development-oriented interests have always 
been well represented. These rural sections of the community have hitherto been over-
represented at the council table. This made it difficult, if not impossible, to embrace fully the 
bold sustainability language implied by Section 5 of the RMA and highlights a fundamental 
weakness of the RMA—effective implementation of a devolved mandate anticipates that 
regional authorities have the capability and political commitment to follow through on the 
implied promises within said mandate (Memon and Skelton, 2007). 
 
3.2 The Information Problem: Bridging Inherent Knowledge Gaps 
Successful collaboration for the sake of environmental sustainability requires the availability 
and incorporation of applicable scientific knowledge, while also recognizing the importance 
of integrating many different kinds of knowledge, including cultural, into problem solving 
processes (Ensminger 1996; Scott 1998; Ingram 2007; Weber and Khademian 2008). 
 There is broad agreement, even within ECAN, that Canterbury lacks the kind of 
systemwide, rationalized and integrated scientific data sets on quantity and quality required to 
manage water resources successfully across the region and with respect to both surface and 
groundwater sources. Substantial repositories of excellent scientific work exist for some 
catchments, and for key reaches of major rivers, yet systematic data across catchments, within 
many catchments, and with accurate assessments of the relationship between current surface 
water demands with groundwater demands and capacities, are in short supply. Nor do 
extensive water metering and general monitoring programs yet exist. Typically, once a water 
consent has been issued it is assumed that the actual use of water matches the amount listed 
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in the original request, although without effective monitoring there is no way to know for 
sure. 
 The lack of data hamstrings ECAN’s ability to develop an effective strategic plan for 
allocating water and shaping stakeholder water use decisions according to the overall, or 
cumulative, effects of an individual resource consent request.  The information asymmetry in 
favour of water users with sizable financial interests in the success of a consent request also 
means that ECAN has limited ability in many situations to refuse a consent request, or to 
defend a consent refusal if the matter goes to the Environment Court. 
 The information deficit problem and the uncertainty associated with the scientific 
information that does exist are further exacerbated by what some describe as “a deeply 
ingrained adversarial science dynamic, or [more colourfully,] the scientists as gladiators idea 
(interview respondent 8). This means that opposing groups hire duelling scientists who then 
present alternative interpretations and understandings of science that tend to support very 
different conclusions as to whether and how much a particular water use, or development, 
will cause harm” (interview respondent s 6 and 8 ).  The indeterminancy associated with 
politically driven adversarial  use of science thus serves to marginalize the role of science, 
even when it does exist, in the decision process. 
 The “scientists as gladiators” concept highlights the political reality accompanying 
any discussion of scientific facts and the uncertainties associated with the exchange, 
translation and application of knowledge in a decision environment marked by political, 
cultural, social and professional diversity.  This component of the knowledge problem 
reflects that fact that information flowing through such a diverse setting is likely to have 
different meanings, uses, values and consequences for the people receiving and using it 
(Weber and Khademian 2008).  It strongly suggests that even if scientific experts can agree 
on either a set of appropriate methodologies/protocols for producing facts, or on a set of facts 
themselves, the work of shepherding and gaining significant support for the conclusions from 
other stakeholders is only just beginning. 
 At the same time, not all stakeholders see the world as scientists and professional 
public managers do.  In other words, scientists, and many managers in charge of 
implementing programs focused on water resources and environmental protection, tend to 
believe that more and better information is an inherently good and desirable thing precisely 
because it leads to better informed decisions.  Yet new information associated with any 
natural resource fundamental to a business or agricultural livelihood also can be a threat by 
introducing uncertainties related to how the information will be used (interview respondent 
5).  It raises questions such as “what will the new information be used for?”  How will it 
affect my ability to practice my livelihood or implement my established, and heretofore 
successful, business plan?  Will the information offer new opportunities for improving my 
business practices or will it be used to restrict my freedom of action?  Will it be used against 
my interests by reducing or eliminating my current of water?  
 
3.3 Operating in a Low Trust Environment 
It has long been established that to the extent an area has strong social capital and high levels 
of trust among the citizenry successful collaborative governance is more likely to be 
forthcoming.  Social capital involves the extent to which a community develops a web of 
horizontal, cooperative, cross-cutting relationships built on trust. More social capital, hence a 
stronger, well-connected web of cooperation cutting across key groups and cultures, increases 
the likelihood of a community, or communities, developing a capacity for effective 
governance of public problems (Putnam 1993; Jackman and Miller 1998).  To the extent that 
such collaborative social capital networks include critical government agencies as well as 
societally based individuals and groups, the likelihood for collaborative success increases 
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even further (Weber 2003; Koontz et al 2004).  The problem for Canterbury, as with so many 
communities around the world, is that it suffers from strong social capital within stakeholding 
groups and weak social capital (low to no trust) between the diverse stakeholders that matter, 
including between government officials and key water user groups and other interested 
parties.  This means that even in a best case scenario the disaggregated character of the 
region’s broader social capital network requires extensive bridging/liaison work.  What is 
behind the disaggregation? 
 The long embedded demarcation, lack of trust, and disparate interests between the 
older money, established rural landholding elite and the urban centers of commerce in 
Canterbury are still strong and can be heard in the everyday conversations of Canterbury 
residents , as observed by a number of interview respondents.  The current divide between 
rural farming and city centre, Christchurch in particular, has been made all the more stark by 
the roller coaster economy associated with agricultural commodities over the past 10 to 15 
years.  A key component of current concerns over water resource use involves the recent 
explosion of water intensive, and highly profitable, dairy farming in place of dryland sheep 
pastures and forests.  In response, the New Zealand Fish and Game Council mounted what it 
viewed as an educational advertising campaign that singled out dairy farming as “Dirty 
Dairying”—not welcomed  rural communities as a message grounded in respect and trust.  
Dairying and other landed agricultural interests, for their part, are also sceptical of those who 
now display what they view as belated concern for “community-based interests” and now ask 
farmers to give up some of their profits for the sake of sustainability.  Opines one farmer, 
“where were all these community-minded folks after the government freed up commodities 
markets in the 1990s and farmers suffered through year after year of low prices, barely 
making ends meet, with bankruptcies and suicides, and so on?  When the economy was sour 
and it was hard to make a living, who was there to help us?  And now that we have adapted 
and are rolling in clover [money] and the global markets are rewarding us, they want us to be 
community-minded” (interview respondent 2). 
 At the same time, the classic divide and lack of trust between government and citizens 
is alive and well in Canterbury.  ECAN, the regional governing body, as it has coped over the 
years with trying to find a workable balance between environmental protection and economic 
growth, has earned the enmity of virtually all the major stakeholders, from environmentalists 
to farmers to developers.  Many stakeholders see the source of the problem in the traditional 
hierarchical, top-down, orientation of ECAN that uses its in-house expertise to decide matters 
and then tell people what to do despite having little knowledge of, or concern for how their 
decisions affect local conditions (interview respondents, 1, 8 and 9).  New Zealand 
Department of Conservation (DOC), for its part, has played a prominent role in two major 
cases that have widened the lack of trust in government agencies.  In the 2001/2002  Fauna 
and Flora survey, the DOC collected significant amounts of biological and ecological 
information from private landowners on plant and animal species residing on their high 
country properties.  The DOC promised not to use the information against landowners by 
way of more extensive and tougher regulations, but eventually reneged on the deal in some 
cases.  In November 2007, DOC used it authority to unilaterally raise land use rents by 
anywhere from ten- to one hundred-fold for agricultural properties in the South Island’s high 
country.  The net effect of raising a property’s rent from $1,000 per year to $10,000, or to 
over $100,000 for the same period sent an unmistakable message—at least from the 
perspective of rural agricultural interests—“the best use of the land is a no use natural state, 
and who cares about the people currently on the land?” (interview respondent 1; New 
Zealand Herald, 11/25/07). 
 The general lack of trust among stakeholders has also been exacerbated by caustic, 
aggressive, no holds barred rhetoric and actions by the national leaders of Federated Farmers.  
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The aggressive, private property-rights orientation of the leadership makes clear that no one 
else can be trusted to represent farmers’ interests effectively and that compromise with 
competing interests is an undesirable strategy.  This type of approach, however, may be 
wearing thin inside many agricultural communities within Canterbury.  Key stakeholders on 
all sides of the water issue sense that some rural landowners and farmers may be growing 
tired of such “overheated, unhelpful rhetoric” and are far less recalcitrant when it comes to 
working with others to resolve legitimate water resource use issues (interview respondent 3).  
To the extent this sentiment does exist, it has not been systematically organized into a 
competing voice representing agricultural interests (interview respondent 5).  On the 
environmental side, despite the general lack of trust, some nationally influential NGO 
leaders, such as Guy Salmon from the Ecologic Foundation and Gary Taylor from the 
Environmental Defence Society, have taken on board the message of addressing 
environmental conflicts collaboratively.  This perspective also has been advocated by leaders 
of Maori tribal organisations such as the South Island based TRONT (Te Runanaga O Ngai 
Tahu) and there is growing evidence of constructive stakeholder engagement at the national 
level and, to a lesser extent, at the regional level that belies the historical adversarialism 
among stakeholders with considerable interest in natural resource issues.  As discussed 
previously, the low trust adversarial dynamic extends to the production and use of scientific 
data in the natural resource policy arena, with “dueling” scientists representing opposing 
interests presenting conflicting data, offering differing interpretations of the same, or similar, 
data sets, and, as a result, tending toward differing policy conclusions. 
 Finally, the mere mention of sustainability as a policy or management goal is often 
enough to raise red flags and added distrust for key stakeholding groups across the 
ideological spectrum. For business and agricultural interests the term carries the baggage of 
“environmental” sustainability, an approach that may well sacrifice and discount economic 
development goals, wealth creation and jobs for the sake of long-term environmental 
protection.  On the other hand, many environmentalists conjure up images of sustainable 
“development,” the term coined by the United Nation’s Brundtland Report in 1987, as a 
policy that in its worst form is an oxymoron and at best gives too much emphasis to 
economic growth at the expense of environmental protection (Hempel 1999, 52).  These 
traditional uses of the term also imply significant top-down government, or regulatory control 
of business and citizen decisions, not a broad-based collaborative approach involving the 
significant involvement of citizens in defining and designing the sustainability framework.  
This limited understanding of sustainability has the potential to increase citizens’ mistrust of 
government and thus hamper attempts to implement a collaborative for the sake of 
sustainable communities.  
 
3.4   Collaborative Capacity Builders, Politics and Cultural Constraints 
The Canterbury setting to date, especially as it pertains to the natural resources policy arena, 
has been largely devoid of the distinctive, critical leadership style afforded by successful 
policy entrepreneurs,5 or more specifically, collaborative capacity builders (CCBs) (Weber 
and Khademian 2008, forthcoming-this is A & S piece). A CCB is someone who either by 
legal authority, expertise valued within a governance setting, reputation as an honest broker, 
or some combination of the three, has been accorded a lead role in public problem solving 
exercises.  While public managers inevitably will be involved in addressing public problems, 
CCBs do not always need to be public managers, although to the extent CCB leadership traits 
                                                 
5
 Blomquist 1992; Heikkila and Gerlak 2005; Kettl 2006; Thomas 2003; Vasi and Macy 
2003; Weber 1998 
 17 
are attached to key public officials within the effort, the likelihood of success improves 
(Daniels and Walker 2001, 173, 183; Weber and Khademian 2008). 
 Collaborative capacity builders have the overarching responsibility to frame the 
approach to problem solving and the relationships between government and other participants 
in the organization or network.  They accept the inhospitable circumstances of heterogeneous 
interests and goals as well as the uncertainties and complexities inherent in any network 
setting and focus their collaborative capacity building actions for the purpose of facilitating 
the integration of knowledge necessary for tackling difficult problems and guiding 
stakeholders forward to successful win-win (or, more realistically, mutual gain) conclusions 
(Weber and Khademian 2008).6  With respect to collaboration in the Canterbury water 
resources case, this means working to craft a network-based culture grounded in a credible, 
effective commitment to collaboration that increases the certainty that participants’ stakes 
will be treated fairly and as legitimate claims within the broader context of sustainability 
goals.  This requires a set of skills and traits, a reputational component, and the execution of 
key tasks. 
 The skills and traits required of a successful collaborative leader or professional 
facilitator are essentially the same, although long-term efforts aimed at institution building as 
opposed to simply the resolution of a non-iterative, or single-shot problem, because they 
require extended, often years long involvement, tend to benefit from the sustained attention 
afforded by a CCB leader with clear stakes in the success of the effort. They include basic 
traits and skills such as the possession of good communication and listening skills, respect for 
and ability to work with all sides of an issue, and strong people skills, meaning that the 
leader/facilitator is comfortable with, and skilled at, interaction and outreach involving a 
diversity of different organizations and individuals. Nor is the CCB afraid to share power 
because s/he realizes this is necessary in order to get to positive sum, or win-win outcomes 
(Ostrom 1990, 101; Sabatier et al. 2005, 185; Weber 1998). 
 In addition, successful CCB’s are persuasive and skillful enough to balance the new 
decisions of self-interested participants within the collaborative, with the needs and interests 
previously codified in collectively decided public goals, whether it is the RMA or other 
mandates. Such collaborative capacity builders are also skilled at convincing others to 
commit to and follow through on promises, cajole participants to stay the course when times 
get rough, and champion the collective, positive sum benefits of successful collaboration.7  
                                                 
6
 Such an approach to the development of governing structures in the public sector has been 
explored by others in far different settings.  In his book Leadership and Administration, 
Philip Selznick (1957) argues that successful managers or leaders infuse their organizations 
with a set of values that can guide the practices and behavior of organization members and 
that are essential to organizational success.  These values focus not only on what the 
organization does, but how the organization does its work—its “distinctive competence”.  
The argument also is similar to La Porte’s (1996) recognition of the importance of a 
“cohering,” or common informing logic “that is persuasive to [a network’s] members in 
providing guides that order their relations with each other.  These cohering logics are a source 
of legitimizing and ordering member relationships” as well as “a central influence in shaping 
the … sources of the net[work’s] rules of engagement”(58). 
7
 Weber (1998). Sabatier’s (1999, 121) policy broker and the professional objectivity inherent 
in the facilitator concept accept and implicitly endorse the activities associated with inspired 
leadership, yet reject the “inspired” nomenclature and the need for charisma. Instead, as the 
facts present themselves, learning occurs, and the walls between beliefs and values are 
broken down, the honest broker/facilitator serves as the neutral functionary who leads 
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 When it comes to the leader/facilitator’s role, key tasks include assisting participants 
in discovering common ground and the benefits of collaboration by identifying prospective 
tradeoffs, facilitating information exchanges, and conducting the decision process in a 
neutral, honest, and fair manner. Implicit in this role conception is that CCBs are instrumental 
in convincing participants that their stakes will be protected during negotiations and decision-
making, and that their participants’ own interests are likely to be best served by agreeing to 
bargain in good faith. 
Given these tasks, successful collaborative capacity builders also benefit from a 
reputation for fair play and honest, trustworthy leadership.  The reputational component 
facilitates stakeholder willingness to move beyond negative caricatures of erstwhile 
adversaries and to share privately held information critical to the kinds of innovative, 
complex, positive sum deals found in multi-party collaborative governance situations. It also 
makes less likely that outcomes will be lopsided bargains favoring one, or a few interests at 
the expense of others (i.e., that individual stakes and interests will be protected and treated 
fairly).     
 Bryan Jenkins, the (unelected) chief executive of ECAN, the regional government, is 
probably closest to matching virtually all aspects of the CCB leadership profile in the 
Canterbury water management case.  Since being appointed in 2005, he has moved cautiously 
to capitalize on his reputation as a successful collaborative leader on natural resource matters 
in Australia by taking steps to encourage community outreach and input within some ECAN 
units and by initiating a region-wide collaboration seeking agreement on key elements of the 
science behind water resource decision-making (interviews).  Yet his attempts to move in this 
direction have been constrained by a number of factors. 
 First, he has faced the problem of a divided culture within the staffing ranks of his 
own agency.  Until recent new staff appointments, , several in ECAN’s senior ranks have had 
a history of preferring both an adverse “effects based” approach to water resource governance 
(as opposed to sustainability) and a top-down, hierarchical approach that favours 
administrative experts in charge as opposed to robust citizen engagement and collaborative 
deliberation and agreement over how best to allocate and manage Canterbury’s water.  The 
division is noted by stakeholders who are unsure as to whether Jenkins attempts to change 
ECAN’s organizational culture to be more supportive of collaboration and strategic, 
sustainability planning will prevail.  Second, there is uncertainty about how far or broadly he 
is willing to engage the collaborative approach, given that the current structure of the 
“science” collaboration just described is heavily weighted toward irrigation, agricultural, and 
other water development interests, and appears to place great faith in the promise of a 
technocratic, engineering-based approach to the water resource management problem.  Third, 
Jenkins is heavily constrained by the fact that he has not yet been joined on the collaborative 
capacity building stage by other prominent stakeholders, whether it is an environmentalist, a 
leader in the agricultural community, or someone else.  All of which may be to say that any 
analysis of the general lack, or cautiousness of CCBs in this case, must once again take into 
account the political setting.  There are limits to how far ECAN’s Jenkins can go on his own 
without support from powerful regional interests and elected officials. 
 
3.5    Maori Values, Treaty Rights and Water 
                                                                                                                                                        
participants through the information maze and collaborative decisions (Sabatier et al. 2005, 
195). 
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Lack of clarity pertaining to Maori customary water rights guaranteed in the Treaty of 
Waitangi is an unresolved issue that has constrained the willingness of Pakeha8 in many parts 
of New Zealand to collaborate with Maori when it comes to water resources. In addition, the 
incorporation of Maori cultural values, practices, and rights pertaining to water creates 
tremendous challenges for water resources planning, allocation  and management given the 
stark differences between existing water resource institutions, rights and practices and the 
communal emphasis in Maori society, their holistic perspective of water as a taonga (a 
treasure), the belief that no separation can be made between water in a river, the riverbed and 
surrounding land, their stance against the mixing of water from different catchments, and 
Maori customary water ownership and management rights as recognised in the Treaty of 
Waitangi. The process of defining the scope of Maori freshwater property rights thus could 
prove to be very divisive with parallels to the contest over negotiating Maori fishery rights 
during the 1990s and more recently the claim by Maori to foreshore and seabed property 
rights. 
Yet this obstacle to collaboration runs head long into one of the primary elements 
associated with collaborative success—inclusivity.  The lesson from the literature is that 
successful collaboratives must include a broad-cross section of stakeholders across interests, 
governmental jurisdictions, and agencies with responsibilities for managing, and claims on, 
the natural resources in question. The inclusivity factor is important for reasons of democratic 
legitimacy and practical considerations related to problem solving and policy 
implementation.9  With regards to the former point, achieving inclusivity requires 
collaboratives to practice government in the sunshine. This means an open access design that 
welcomes interested parties, and that encourages and allows a broad array of citizens and 
government officials to participate in proceedings, including “outsiders” who may only wish 
to monitor and report on collaborative activities to those outside the community where the 
effort is occurring. “Open access” also voluntarily endorses the community’s right to know 
about its proceedings, decisions, and projects by giving public notice of meetings, providing 
public access to meeting minutes, creating pertinent databases associated with decisions and 
projects, sponsoring public field trips, and, more generally, engaging the public through 
regular outreach activities. 
At the same time, pragmatism suggests that all stakeholders in a position to block or 
effectively undermine outcomes must be included and given a credible stake in the 
collaborative. Otherwise, collaborative participants encounter added uncertainty and face a 
greater likelihood of failure, as those left out mobilize resources in defense of their stakes. 
Failure to practice inclusion thus lessens the probability that implementation and the 
establishment of the kinds of durable, effective policy programs able to deliver long-term 
problem solving benefits will occur. 
Further complicating matters is that the inclusion of the Maori may well exacerbate 
the problems in Canterbury arising from increased water use and unsustainable land use 
practices.  This is because while many Canterbury stakeholders (both Maori and Pakeha) give 
                                                 
8
 A Maori term to refer to New Zealanders of European descent. 
9
 See Daniels and Walker (2001, 21, 174-75), although there are some limits on this, 
particularly their call to “[r]educe the number of parties on each side” in order to make 
negotiation more manageable” (182). However, note that this advice does not reduce the 
number of key interests or viewpoints at the collaborative bargaining table, rather it includes 
representatives from distinctive interests. See also Weber (1998, 116-117) and Sabatier et al. 
(2005, 184, 195). 
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credit to the very positive stance of the South Island Maori tribe Ngai Tahu toward 
cooperating with others on water management issues, the corporate tribal authority for the 
Ngai Tahu—the TRONT—is insisting that collaboration in this area be conditioned on 
awarding the Maori their treaty-based property rights, largely so that they can expand their 
dairying operations, hence income.  In this sense, the push for cooperation is not directed at a 
better collective outcome for the Canterbury region in terms of integrated, sustainable water 
resource management, rather it is for the purpose of gaining control over more water for the 
purpose of concentrated economic gains for Maori interests (interview respondent 2).     
 
  
4. Where to from here? 
 
In recent years, water resource management in New Zealand has begun a cautious move 
away from a hierarchical top-down, regional council–directed decision process towards a 
collaborative governance approach of negotiation and problem solving. We refer to this as the 
network model of water governance. This emergent approach to water resource decision-
making reflects dissatisfaction with traditional strategies and their inability to deal with a 
variety of inter-related problems including water allocation, water quality and protection of 
intrinsic in-stream ecological values. These problems often require a detailed knowledge of 
local situations and catchment conditions, and the coordination of multiple agencies focused 
on the diverse, and often divergent, interests of catchment stakeholders and those of various 
different Canterbury communities. 
 
In contrast to the hiatus that has prevailed until recently in the minds of some senior ECAN 
officials, they should now have no doubts now about ECAN’s water resource governance 
mandate10. In fact, during the last few years, Environment Canterbury has already sought, in 
the course of exercising this mandate, different ways to address a number of commonly held 
concerns amongst stakeholders articulated in the analysis above.11  The balance of urban-
rural representation is now--following the election outcomes in November 2007--arguably 
more representative and robust as an electoral democracy forum for sustainable water 
governance. The big challenge for ECAN now is how to go about overcoming the obstacles 
to collaboration on water resources noted above infuse a much stronger measure of 
participatory governance with institutional arrangements and decision making processes 
grounded in liberal electoral democracy, in exercising its water mandate. In this section, we 
highlight points that could enhance the effectiveness of participatory water governance 
initiatives.  
 
                                                 
10
 The Act was  amended  in 2005 to clarify the water resource allocation functions of 
regional councils  in order to address the uncertainty in the minds of  many councils 
regarding the scope of their functions. These amendments reconfirm that regional council 
functions include the establishment of rules in a regional plan to allocate water. In addition, 
subject to Part 2 of the RMA, a plan can allocate water resources amongst competing 
activities.10  However, little has been done by central government to address resourcing 
capacity and commitment issues. 
11
 For example, the recent Conway River and the Hurunui River flow regime planning 
processes involved river stakeholders (farmers and environmental groups) in the development 
of 'draft' policy. This draft was presented to the Regional Planning Committee for variation to 
the NRRP for the flow regimes of these rivers. This is now becoming common practice.    
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We endorse the recent decision by ECAN to allocate a higher priority to prepare catchment 
based water plans12 on a collaborative basis. Given this, it is imperative that a robust 
foundation should be laid to embed formal and informal collaborative practices in rural and 
natural resource governance institutions such as ECAN to sustain such collaborative efforts. 
Toward this end, we suggest the following: 
  
• Collaborative approaches are not magic bullets and should be used appropriately. They 
are not justified in situations where existing institutions are already adequate. 
 
• In catchments where low trust and weak social capital exist, the collaborative approach 
to watershed management should be designed to foster trust and a culture of 
cooperation among relevant stakeholders, including scientists. This is because to the 
extent that low trust exists, this must be resolved first before one can resolve the 
information problem. Otherwise, opponents will throw up enough “doubt” with their 
own scientific results that a decision-maker won’t be able to know the best science 
when they see it anyway (because they are not scientists) (Melnick 1983). 
 
• Start the information search process by focusing on important, yet less controversial, 
widely accepted information needs as one way to build trust. 
 
• decrease scientific uncertainty and increase scientific knowledge acceptability (hence 
increased likelihood of use) through the joint development (i.e., deliberation by all 
stakeholders) of, and agreement on, science protocols and research agendas. 
 
• Collaborative institutions should develop milestones, and measure, and monitor 
progress at regular intervals with respect to the primary social, economic and 
environmental goals. 
 
• Practitioners should rely on the lessons of institutional design described above to design 
and manage the collaborative structures and processes and to avoid escalating conflicts 
to other venues, such as the Environment Court (on this last point, see “binding rules” 
in particular). Resorting to coercive regulatory or judicial tools may destroy the 
collaborative process. However, if collaborative processes are used by stakeholders to 
delay or avoid environmental improvements, then the traditional regulatory tools should 
be considered (i.e., keep the hammer in your back pocket, never completely put it 
away). 
 
• Without consistent and adequate enforcement of current regulatory provisions for water 
management of water allocation and water quality provisions by ECAN, there is limited 
incentive for many parties to collaborate. 
 
• The watershed collaborative must be perceived as representative (inclusive) of the 
stakeholders for it to be legitimate.  
 
• Do not be afraid of intense ideological conflict. If proper strategies (as described above) 
are employed to guide the conflict toward increasing peer understanding of the sources 
of the conflict, this intensity can ensure continued participation in the collaborative 
process. 
                                                 
12
 or for groups of  spatially contiguous catchments. 
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• Do not expect stakeholders to change deeply held core beliefs over the course of the 
collaborative process, but instead use the lessons provided above to design the 
collaborative process to develop understanding of the sources of the positions held by 
the conflicting parties and attempt to create policies that address multiple concerns. 
 
• Engage applied researchers with procedural and scientific expertise in the watershed 
collaboration process. This can enhance the probability of achieving substantive 
legitimacy and credibility to defining the scope of knowledge applicable to a watershed 
issue. Not only can they provide insight into the state of knowledge on issues, they can 
also provide analysis of new and existing data provided by stakeholders in the 
watershed collaborative. 
 
• ECAN’s organisational culture needs to be reviewed. Currently there is no central 
integrating unit to tie together, or make coherent, the decisions and approaches of the 
various different units within ECAN.  Clear and consistent support from ECAN for 
collaboration is required. 
 
• Make sure that leaders of collaborative efforts fit, as best as possible, the description 
outlined above when it comes to skill sets, reputation, and ability to manage 
successfully a multi-faceted, often difficult negotiating environment. 
 
• Some stakeholders will likely require additional incentives to participate in good faith, 
especially in cases where compliance cost burdens are likely to be considerable, are 
distributed inequitably, and/or involve the diminishment of a stakeholder’s water usage 
right for the sake of the common good. Others will require binding guarantees prior to 
fully engaging a collaborative effort.  In the former case, one possibility involves the 
concept of “shared savings.” For example, if the actual water use associated with an 
individual consent is less than the consent amount, then some of the “surplus” water is 
devoted to environmental/water quality/ecosystem health needs, some is banked for 
future community allocation and use, and some is left in the hands of the original 
consent holder for either expanding their own operations, or for donating or 
selling/leasing to others. In the donation case, the water consent holder would get some 
kind of credit of value to them, in the selling option they would get cash. Other 
examples of more general “rules” voluntarily binding stakeholder behaviour in order to 
reduce the uncertainty associated with collaboration are noted in the institutional 
design discussion earlier in the paper. 
 
• Two other environmental agencies in Canterbury (Fish and Game and DOC) exercise 
an important monitoring and review role in the region and should be adequately 
resourced and included within collaborative efforts. 
 
• All stakeholders should remember that collaborative approaches to water management 
are not easy and are time consuming, and that while the prescriptive design elements 
outlined above will assist in the quest for successful collaboration and decision 
outcome, participants should be willing, ready and able to incorporate additional 
elements that may well make sense in a specific catchment. 
5. Conclusion 
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Sustainability in the water sector demands significant changes in established, traditional 
formal and informal governance institutions in order to modify socio-economic and 
organisational behaviours to take account of sustainability well-beings. It is unrealistic to 
limit the scope of water sector reforms to fine-tuning administrative and technical approaches 
to address water conflicts when the real issues are those of power, competition, lack of social 
trust and related ingrained social mores and behaviours not compatible with sustainability 
objectives. These are frequently the ultimate structural constraints to sustainability (Connor 
and Dovers, 2004).  
We have argued in this paper that institutional inertia, in terms of formal and informal 
institutional constraints on water governance, is a major barrier to realizing the innovative 
potential of the RMA’s water planning provisions.  . While the RMA has devolved the water 
management mandate to an inadequately resourced local government sector, until recently 
central government has essentially taken a hands-off role in providing national policy 
guidance. Too much reliance has been accorded by regional councils to formal hierarchical 
approaches to managing water,   based on statutory RMA plans and the related practice of 
allocating water on a first come, first served rule, as in the past.  There have been limited 
opportunities for stakeholders to collaborate on crafting water management solutions in a 
deliberative and communicative manner. Strong government and strong governance are not 
mutually exclusive or necessarily competing imperatives for promoting sustainable water 
governance. We endorse the recently adopted strategy by ECAN  to focus on catchment 
based water plans developed on a collaborative basis and conclude with suggestions to 
enhance the robustness of  collaborative processes. 
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i
 Daniels and Walker (2001, 21, 174-75), Sabatier et al. (2005, 184, 195), and Weber (1998, 
116-117). 
ii
 Daniels and Walker (2001, 72-73), Weber (1998, 115-16; 2003, 4, 77), and Sabatier, Leach, 
Lubell and Pelkey (2005, 195). 
iii
 Daniels and Walker (2001, 22, 63), Ostrom (1990, 88-90), Sabatier et al. (2005, 195), and 
Weber (1998, 111, 117).  
iv
 Daniels and Walker (2001, 184); Weber (2003, 87). 
v
 Daniels and Walker (2001, xviii, 181); Weber (2003, 87). 
vi
 Daniels and Walker (2001, 184, 187); Weber (2003, 89). 
vii
 Daniels and Walker (2001); Weber (2003, 237). 
viii
 Daniels and Walker (2001, 184); Weber (2003, 88). 
ix
 Daniels and Walker (2001, 184). 
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x
 Daniels and Walker (2001, 181); Weber (2003, 88). 
xi
 The argument is that accepting a dual role as community member and representative of a 
particular interest obligates participants to take a broader view of problems, thus encouraging 
more constructive discussion and deliberation, and ultimately contributing to problem solving 
and goal achievement (see Weber 2003, 88-89). Daniels and Walker (2001) endorse a similar 
dynamic associated with role reversal, imaging, and mirroring exercises (184). 
xii
 See Sabatier et al. (2005, 185). Ostrom (1990) notes the importance of “low-cost” conflict 
resolution services and finds that “leaders are … the basic resolvers of conflict” (101). 
xiii
 These individuals can and do come from anywhere within participant ranks. The key to 
success appears to be the presence of the collaborative leadership characteristics less so than 
the organizational location of the leadership itself (Daniels and Walker 2001, 173, 183; 
Weber and Khademian 2008). 
 
xiv
 Walker and Daniels (2001) argue the need for “a strong, demonstrated, literal commitment 
to the collaboration process” (182). The concept of credible commitment for Weber (1998), 
while not noted as a key factor, infuses the AM framework thoroughly (see pp. 113-115). 
xv
 The ACF model argues that “there should be continuity in the participation of 
representatives from a given organization … [because] [t]urnover kills trust building” 
(Sabatier et al. 2005, 195). For the assurance mechanism, see Weber (2003, 198). 
xvi
 This element does not mean that the status quo is the measure of collaborative success, 
rather it is a legitimate starting point. By definition, the collaborative has been engaged to 
combat and manage problems that have arisen precisely because of past and present practices 
and management regimes. What it does mean is that participants are dedicated to facilitating 
meaningful change while including existing livelihoods in plans for the “place’s” future, all 
while recognizing the likelihood that modifications to such livelihoods will be needed to 
achieve the ultimate goal of long-term problem solving success. 
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